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Cert to CA9 {Kennedy, 
Tang, Poole) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Whether a plaintiff whose trademark has achieved 
incontestable status under the Lanham Act is entitled to enjoin 
others from using the mark on that basis. 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Under§ 15 of the Lanham Act, 15 
u.s.c. § 1065, a trademark registered with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office can attain incontestable status under certain 
conditions. The owner of the mark must file an affidavit 
testifying that the mark has been registered for five years, that 





the subject of a final, adverse decision as to its ownership or 
registration, and that no such proceeding is pending. Under§ 
1115(b), once a mark has become incontestable, registration is 
conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use 
the mark subject only to the cancellation provisions of§ 1064 
and the defenses enumerated in§ 1115(b). 1 
In 1969, petr, the operator of long term parking lots near 
airports in St. Louis, Cleveland, Boston, Atlanta, Houston, 
Memphis, and San Francisco, filed an application with the Patent 
and Trademark Office to re_g_ i ~~er a service mark consisting of an 
~ ~ 
airplane logo and the words, "Park 'N Fly." After the 
application was initially denied, the registration issued in 
Ill/ t,\ 2 
1971. In 1977, petr obtained incontestable status for the mark. 
Resp operates a long term parking lot near an airport in -
Portland, Oregon, using the term "Dollar Park and Fly." Petr 
filed suit against resp, requesting that resp be enjoined from 
-
using the words "P~rk and Fly." Resp counterclaimed, asking that 
' petr's mark be cancelled. The DC entered judgment for petr, 
~ -
1The seven defenses listed in§ 1115(b) are: (1) fraudulent 
registration; (2) abandonment; (3) use with permission of the 
registrant "so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or 
services in connection with which the mark is used;" (4) the 
alleged infringer is using the mark "otherwise than as a trade or 
service mark;" (5) prior innocent adoption and use; (6) prior 
registration and use; and (7) prior or current use to violate the 
federal antitrust laws. 
2 In 1977, petr filed an application to register only the words 
"Park 'N Fly." The registration issued, but it has not become 
incontestable. The CA9 determined that it did not need to pass 
on the validity of this registration. App., at A-5 n. 3. 
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concluding that resp had not shown that the mark should be 
cancelled and that petr was therefore entitled to an injunction. 
On appeal, the CA9 first affirmed the DC's conclusion that 
resp had failed to produce enough evidence to show that the mark 
should be cancelled. The court observed that if an incontestable 
mark becomes "generic" {i.e., "it comes to be understood as 
referring to the genus of which the product or service is a 
species"}, it may be cancelled pursuant to 15 u.s.c. § 1064{c}. 
However, an incontestable mark cannot be cancelled because it is 
merely "descriptive" {i.e., "it describes a characteristic or 
ingredient of an article or service"} even though a mark that is 
descriptive cannot be registered unless the owner shows that it 
has acquired a secondary meaning {i.e., "it becomes distinctive 
of the applicant's goods or services"}. In the present case, the 
CA9 held, resp had not shown that petr's mark was generic. -Therefore, the DC had not erred in refusing to invalidate the 
mark 
However, the CA9 reversed the DC's decision to grant an 
injunction to petr. The court rejected petr's argument that the 
incontestablity of its mark automatically entitled it to 
ve relief unless one of the seven defenses listed in§ 
1115{b) applied. Noting that petr's argument was supported by 
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 {CA7), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976), the court stated that "[t]he 
~ law in this circuit •.• is different." The court found that under 
_..,,,, Tillamook County Cream Ass'n v. Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass'n, 
• 345 F.2d 158, 163 {CA9}, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 {1965), "a 
• 
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registrant can use the incontestable status of its mark 
defensively, as a shield to protect its mark against 
cancellation, but it cannot use it offensively, as a sword to 
enjoin another's use." The court then concluded that petr's mark 
was merely descriptive and that petr had not shown that it had 
acquired any secondary meaning. Therefore, since petr's "mark 
would not be entitled to continued registration but for its 
incontestable status, and [since] its federal registration is of 
no import" in determining whether an injunction should issue, the 
court ruled that petr was not entitled to have resp enjoined from 
using the name "park and fly." 
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the CA9's ruling is in 
direct conflict with the CA7's ruling in Union Carbide. In Union 
Carbide, the CA7 expressly rejected its earlier adoption of the 
defensive/offensive distinction utilized by the CA9 in this case. 
531 F.2d, at 377. The CA7's approach has been followed by the 
CAS, John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 113-116 (CAS 
1966) and the CA3, United State Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 
639 F.2d 134 (CA3 1981). Indeed, one district court has 
expressly rejected the CA9 approach in favor of the CA7 approach 
in granting injunctive relief to petr on the basis of the 
incontestability of its mark. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Park & Fly, 
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 422 (D. Mass. 1979). Thus, petr argues, its 
mark is entitled to more protection in one part of the country 
than in another. This directly undermines the Lanham Act, which 




Petr contends that the Court should resolve the conflict in 
favor of the CA7 approach because nothing in the Act states or 
implies that incontestability can only be used to defend the 
mark. Section 1115(b) expressly states that "the registration 
shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right 
to use the registered mark" subject only to the seven listed 
defenses. The descriptive nature of the trademark is not one of 
the listed defenses. The CA9's efforts to judicially engraft 
such a provision into the Act should be reversed because it 
denies trademark owners the right to the exclusive use provided 
by§ 1115(b). 
Resp notes that the CA9 opinion is consistent with the 
approach of the l-cAa in Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Saunders 
Archery Co., 516 F.2d 846, 851 (CAB 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
870 (1975) and Prudential Insurance Co. v. Gibraltar Financial 
Corp, 694 F.2d 1150 (CA9 1982), cert. denied, No. 82-1789 (June 
27, 1983). Union Carbide is distinguishable because the mark in 
that case was not shown to be descriptive, as in this case. 
Resp also contends that a reversal of the CA9's ruling will 
not change the result in this case because there is evidence that 
resp was in privity with a Seattle corp. which, without knowledge 
of petr's prior use of the mark, used the term "park and fly" 
before the mark was registered. Thus, resp is entitled to use 
the defense listed in§ 1115(b) (5). Moreover, resp uses its 
mark in a market that is geographically distinct from that in 
which petr uses its mark. Under existing law, the owner of a 
mark is not entitled to an injunction against one using the mark 
• 
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in a different market area. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food 
Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (CA2 1959). Finally, resp contends 
that the defenses contained in§ 1115(b) are not the sole basis 
for refusing to grant an injunction to the owner of an 
incontestable mark. The incontestability section (§ 1065) itself 
contains limits on the meaning of incontestability. 
DISCUSSION: The ~ with Union Carbide is d~ ct ,; as 
the CA9 itself admits and as commen t a t ors have noted. See 4A 
Callman, Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, Preface 
at iii,§ 25.08 (4th ed.). Moreover, the issue seems to be one 
of some importance since, as this case shows, the owner of an 
incontestable mark may have different rights for the same mark in 
different jurisdictions. 
Resp's contentions concerning the alternative bases for 
upholding the CA9's decision raise issues expressly reserved by 
the CA9. App. at A-7 n. 4. Thus, if the Court wants to review 
the issue raised by petr, it can do so without rendering an 
advisory opinion. If the Court rules in petr's favor, it can 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
Court denied cert in a case raising a similar 
Insurance Co., No. 82-1789, cert. denied, 
}4 Last term the 
Vt issue. Prudential 
(June 23, 1983). However, the conflict was not as direct since 
Prudential Insurance addressed the availability of non-statutory 
equitable defenses to defeat the effect of incontestability, 
something the CA7 did not rule out in Union Carbide. 531 F.2d, 
at 388-389. Given the direct nature of the conflict in this 
case, I recommend a grant. 
-
I recommend a grant. 
There is a response. 
February 22, 1984 
--7-
Worthen Opin in petn. 
- -
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83-1132 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. 
This is a trademark case we took to resolve a 
flat conflict between CA9 {that decided this case) and 
decisions in CA2, CA5, CA7 and CAl0. The petitioner 
corporation has been in business since 1969, and operates 
in a number of major cities including San Francisco. 
Respondent has been in business since 1973, and operates 
only in Portland, Oregon. In 1969 petitioner filed an 
application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
seeking a registration of its mark then consisting of an 
airplane logo and the words "Park 'N Fly". Registration 
was issued in 1971, and it is conceded that petitioner 
obtained "incontestable status for that mark in 1977". 
See Pet. A-2; see also respondent's brief p. 2. Later in 
1977 a second application was filed consisting solely of 
the words "Park N Fly", and registration was issued in 
1979. Section 1065 of the Lanhan Act provides explicitly 
that, subject to seven specified exceptions set forth in 
§1115, f when a "registered mark has been in continuous 
use for five consecutive years subsequent to the date of 
such registration and is still in use in commerce, {it) 
shall be incontestable". It also is conceded, as I 
- - 2. 
understand it, that none of the seven specified exceptions 
is applicable in this case {for the provisions of §1115, 
seep. 3,4 of the petition for cert). 
CA9's Decision 
Petitioner filed this suit seeking an injunction 
against respondent's using the name "Park and Fly". 
Respondent filed a counterclaim requesting cancellation of 
petitioner's registered marks. The District Court held 
that petitioner's registered marks were valid and that 
respondent had infinged, and entered an injunction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. The Court said: 
"Given the incontestable status of Park 'N Fly's 
registration and respondent's failure to show 
that the mark is generic {the Court noted a 
failure of evidence in this respect), we 
conclude that on this record the DC did not err 
in refusing to invalidate that mark." Pet. A-5. 
But CA9 reversed the grant of injunctive relief 
by the DC. It noted that under the holding of CA7 in 
Union Carbide v. Ever-Ready, 531 F.2d 366, cert. den. 428 
U.S. 830 {1976), that "a plaintiff in an infringement 
action establishes conclusively, under §1115{b), his 
exclusive right to use a trademark to the extent he shows 
- - 3. 
his trademark has become incontestable under §1065. My 
understanding is that three other circuits have held to 
the same effect. 
But CA9 went on to say that "the law in this 
circuit, however, is different". Citing a 1965 decision, 
it held: 
"A registrant can use the incontestable status 
of its mark defensively, as a shield to protect 
its mark against cancellation and to protect its 
right to continued use of the mark, but not 
offensively, as a sword to enjoin another's 
use." Pet. A-6. 
CA9 did not end its opinion at this point. It 
noted that respondent argued that its mark is "suggestive 
with respect to airport parking lots". CA9 stated that it 
was "unpersuaded" because the words "park and fly" are a 
"clear and concise description of a characteristic or 
ingredient of the service offered - the customer parks his 
car and flies from the airport". CA9 therefore concluded 
that the "Park and Fly mark . is at best a merely 
descriptive mark". Pet. A-7. Moreover, CA9 observed that 
no claim was made that the mark had acquired a secondary 
meaning. 
Argument of the Parties 
- - 4. 
Petitioner relies essentially on the statutory 
language providing for incontestability, and on the weight 
of authority contrary to CA9's unique position. 
Respondent, of course, argues that CA9's 
decision is correct, but does not seem to rely on CA9's 
distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" use of an 
incontestable mark. Rather, respondent says: 
"The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals is correct because it refused to enforce 
a merely descriptive mark which erroneously 
became 'incontestable' without any showing of 
secondary meaning. Merely descriptive marks are 
inherently unregistrable on the Principal 
Register because they do not comply with the 
requirements. of 15 u.s.c. §1052(e) of the 
Lanham Act." 
Br. 9, 10. 
CA9, as I read its opinion, accepted the fact 
that the mark was duly registered and therefore was 
incontestable under the Act. Respondent's position 
therefore appears to be inconsistent with CA9's basic 
rationale. Yet, in the next to final paragraph of its 
opinion, CA9 after expressing doubt as to the mark, 
concluded "that Par 'N Fly's mark used in the context of 
airport parking is, at best, a merely descriptive mark", 
an £ further noted that no claim had been made of a 
secondary meaning. 
- - 5. 
Petitioner's brief, as noted above, is directed 
specifically against CA9 's distinction between offensive 
and defensive use of a mark conceded to be incontestable. 
I will be interested in seeing, therefore, how 
petitioner's reply brief (not yet in hand} answers 
respondent's broader and perhaps more persuasive argument. 
* * * 
This is not an area in which I am knowledgeable. 




- - March Court ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
PARK 'N FLY, INC. 
vs. 







MERITS I MOTION 
G D N I POST IDIS I AFF I REV IAFF I G D 
v 
;;;1 ··••l• 0 •••~•-•l•••••I••·• 
Brennan, J .................... A ... , .... 1 ••••• 1 •••• 1 •••• , •••• 
White, J ........................ ·t ... j ... -i- .. -~ •· .. . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
✓ 
Blackmun, J .. • • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · V 
• • • ... • • • t ••.•I•••• •I••• •I•••• Powell, J ... • • •···· · · · · ··· ··· / 
• J • • •r • •;-1 • •••I•••••~•• •I•••• Rehnquist, .. • • • · · · · · · · · · · · · · V
1 
Stevens, J .............. ·· · · ··· · ··· ···r·· ·1~ ·3· 






-~ 1a/~ ,_ 
-ml 09/28/84 W~ frY'"{~q_~ 
 ~ ~ C-4 '7 
</-- ..5' ~ ~ ~ ~t.+ 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell September 28, 1984 
From: Annmarie 
Re: Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. 
No. 83-1132 
Question Presented 
Did CA9 err in refusing to enforce a trademark on the ground that 
it was 
...____.,. 
merely d e} riptive, 
~
when 
"incontestable" under the Lanham Act? 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
the mark had become 
The Lanham Act provides that under certain conditions, the 
right to use a mark registered with the Patent and Trademark 
Office [ hereafter "PTO"] becomes incontestable. Under 15 u.s.c. -
~ 
- 2. - ~~ 
h~~I--
§1065, if a mark has been used continuously for five consecutive 
years subsequent to the date of its registration and is still in -
use, "the right of the registrant to use such registered mark in 
commerce • • shall be incontestable," provided that certain 
conditions obtain. 1 The Act specifies these ¢onditions1 (1) that 
t here is no final decision adverse to the registrant's claim of 
ownership of the mark or to the registrant's right to register or 
keep the registration of the mark; (2) that there is no pending 
proceeding i n the PTO or any court involving rights to the mark; 
( 3) that the registrant file an affidavit with the PTO within one 
year of the expiration of the five year period, which attests 
that the two preceding conditions exist, describes the goods and 
services on which the mark has been used for the five year 
period, and attests that the mark is still being used; ( 4) that 
"no incontestable right shall be acquired in a mark which is the 
common descriptive name of any article or substance ••.• " 2 
The Act also details the evidentiary value of registration 
and incontestable status. Under 15 u.s.c. §1115(a), registration 
is prima facie evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to 
'C~ 
use the mark, but "shall not preclude an opposing party from 
z 
1There are e~ ons to incontestability, however, for cases 
where there is a ground on which an application to cancel a 
registration may be filed under§ 1064(c) and (e) and where a 
registered mark infringes a valid right acquired under state law 
~rior to registration. These exceptions are not applicable here. 
A "common descriptive" mark, also known as a generic mark, 
refers to one that is commonly understood as referring to the 
genus of which the particular product or service is a species. 
See Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries 
Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (CA9 1979); Abercrombie & Fitch v. 
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (CA2 1976). 
~ 
• 
- - 3. 
proving any legal or equitable defense or defect which might have 
been asserted if such mark had not been registered." Subsection 
(b) provides, however, that if the right to use a mark has 
become incontestable under §1065, "the registration shall be 
conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use 
the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the 
goods or services specified in the affidavit," except when one of 
seven defenses are established: (1) that the registration or 
incontestable right was obtained fraudulently; (2) that the 
registrant has abandoned the mark; (3) that the mark is being 
used by the registrant or a person in privity with the registrant 
to misrepresent the source of the goods or services; (4) that the 
use charged to be infringing is a "fair use" "otherwise than as a 
trade or service mark;" (5) that the party or one in privity with 
him has continuously used the challenged mark from a date before 
the registration of the mark under the Act; (6) that the mark 
whose use is charged as an infringement was registered and used 
prior to the registration under the Act and not abandoned; ( 7) 
that the mark is or has been used to violated the antitrust laws. 
15 u.s.c. §1115(b). 
B. Prior Proceedings 
Petr has two registered trademarks: the words "Park 'N Fly" 
accompanied by the logo of an airplane and the words "Park 'N 
Fly" without the logo. The former was registered in 1971 after 
the PTO initially denied registration on the ground that the 
phrase was merely descriptive. The latter was registered in 1979 
without opposition. In March, - 1977, petr executed an affidavit 
- - 4. 
pursuant to 15 u.s.c. §1065 to establish the incontestability of 
the first mark. 
In February, 1977, petr wrote resp, a business similar to 
its own, which operated under the name "Dollar Park and Fly." 
Petr demanded that resp cease using the words "park" and "fly" in 
its name. When resp refused, petr filed suit in federal court 
(D.Or.), charging resp with infringment of its registered service 
mark "Park 'N Fly" and seeking injunctive relief. Resp 
counterclaimed, and sought a declaration that petr's marks were 
invalid and subject to cancellation because they were merely 
descriptive. 
After a trial on the merits, the DC found in favor of petr 1)<:_. 
and enjoined resp from further use of the same or similar marks. 
The DC held that because petr's 1first: \ mark was incontestable 
under the terms of the Lanham Act, resp could only defend against 
infringement by establishing one of the defenses specified in 
§1115 (b) • Thus, the court ruled, resp could not challenge the 
mark on the ground that it was merely descriptive. 3 Because the ,, \ \ 
second mark was so close to the first, the court concluded that 
2
~ 
any infringement of one would necessarily be an infringement of /k../:>f 
the other. Accordingly, the fact that petr's second mark had not /,,,zA..) ~ 
----- -
yet become incontestable in its own right was irrelevant. 
The DC also rejected all of resp's other contentions, most 
importantly two statutory defenses: (1) that petr's mark was 
3A "merely descriptive" mark is one which specifically 
describes a characteristic or ingredient of an article or 
service. 601 F.2d at 1014-15; 537 F.2d at 9-11. 
{A,x_~ 
- - 5. 
generic and thus not entitled to protection, and ( 2) that resp 
was in privity was another company using the name "Park and Fly" 
prior to petr's registration. The court specifically found that 
petr's mark was not generic and that there was "no evidence" of 
privity between the two corporations. 
On appeal, CA9 affirmed in part and reversed in part. The CA 
upheld the DC' s ruling that petr 's trademarks are valid, but 
reversed the DC's grant of injunctive relief. CA9 held that the 
) ' 
incontestable status of a mark could only be used 
1
defensively to 
protect the mark against cancellation, not offensively to support 
an injunction. ---- In reaching this conclusion the court recognized that its decision conflicted with CA7's in Union Carbide v. Ever-
Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). 
II. Discussion 
CA9's decision raises two questions about the proper 
interpretation of the incontestable status provisions of the 
Lanham Act. First, is CA9 correct that incontestable status may --
be used only defensively as conclusive evidence of the 
registrant's right to use the mark? Second, is CA9 correct that 
an alleged infringer may defend on the ground that an 
incontestable mark is merely descriptive and thus not properly 
registrable at all? 
A. Statutory Language 
1. Offensive/Defensive Uses of Incontestable Status. CA9 
makes no attempt to base its distinction between offensive and 
defensive uses of incontestable status on the language of the 
statute, and it seems to me that there are no grounds for doing 




- - 6. 
so. The subsection of the Act which provides that incontestable 
status shall be conclusive evidence of the right to exclusive use 
of a mark, 15 u.s.c. §1115(b), appears in a part of the Lanham 
Act entitled, "Registration on principal register as evidence of 
exclusive right to use mark; defenses." It is preceded by the 
subsection which makes the fact of registration prima facie 
evidence of the registrant's right to exclusive use of the mark 
in question. 15 u.s.c. §1115(a). The prima facie evidence 
provision applies by its terms to registrations under the Act 
"owned by a party to an action." Subsection (b) does not include 
this language, but simply provides that an incontestable mark 
shall be "conclusive evidence" of the registrant's exclusive 
right to use it. 
It is difficult to accept CA9's interpretation that the 
effect of incontestable status depends on whether the owner of 
the mark is using it offensively or defensively. In the first 
place, the statute does not distinguish between offensive and 
'----,., --....... 
defensive uses of such status, and its plain language that 
incontestable status shall be conclusive evidence of the 
registrant's right to use the mark is logically applicable 
whether the registrant is a plaintiff or a defendant. 
Second, §1115 as a whole is directed to the evidentiary 
- --- ------
value of registration generally, with subsection (a) governing 
prior to a mark's becoming incontestable, and subsection (b) 
governing thereafter. It seems to me that the two subsections 
should be r~ad together, because they describe the sequence in 
which the evidentiary value of registration develops. So viewed, 
~ 
~ 
- - 7. 
subsection (a) 's reference to "a party to an action" implicitly 
applies to subsection (b) as well, since subsection (b) addresses 
the same issue (the evidentiary value of registration) at a later 
point in time. 
In addition, three of the statutory defenses available to 
defeat the conclusive effect of incontestable status assume that 
such status may be used offensively. With respect to the 
defenses of fair use, prior registration and use of the mark, and 
prior use without registration of the mark, the statute speaks of 
use "charged as an infringement." 15 u.s_.c. §1115(b) (4), (5), (6). 
Thus, the Act apparently contemplates that the owners of marks 
with incontestable status will sue other users for infringement, 
raising such status as conclusive evidence. CA9's interpretation 
renders these three defenses meaningless. If one could not use 
incontestable status offensively, then there would be no need to 
provide any defenses applicable to a use "charged as an 
infringement." Moreover, the provision of these defenses as 
exceptions to the conclusive effect rule implies that when they 
do not apply, a plaintiff may use incontestability as conclusive * 
evidence. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, 531 F.2d 366, 373 
(CA7) , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). 
2. "Mere Descriptiveness" as a Defense. CA9's decision also 
raises a question whether a party charged with infringement can ------------------- ----
defend his use on the ground that the incontestable mark is 





however, the plain language of the statute a,1~ 






- - 8. 
makes incontestable marks conclusive evidence "except when one of 
the following defenses or defects is established . It Mere 
descriptiveness is not among the enumerated defenses or defects 
and thus I think the statute precludes reliance on such a defense 
in the case of an incontestable mark. 
B. Case Law Interpreting §1115(b} 
CA9's interpretation of §1115(b} is the minority position. 
CA9 originally adopted its position by following CA7's decision 
in John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 314 (CA7 
1961}, a case which CA7 subsequently overruled in Union Carbide 
Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
830 (1976}. In reaching its decision to overrule Morrell, CA7 
cited the plain language of §1115 (b} discussed above and noted 
that its earlier decision in Morrell was based on dicta. 
Other circuits have adopted the position of Union Carbide, ---------
holding that once a registrant establishes that his mark is 
incontestable under §1065, it cannot be challenged on the ground 
of mere descriptiveness. ~, Beer Nuts1_ Inc. v. Clover Club ~ 
Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 n. 7 ~ 1983}; United States ~J 
Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134 @)1981}; Soweco, ~ 
Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178 § 1980}; Park 'N Fly v. ~ 
Park & Fly, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 422 (D. Mass. 1979}; Salton, Inc. ~ 
v. Cornwall, 477 F. Supp. 975, 987-988 (D.N.J. 1979}. 





Resp raises six arguments supporting CA9 's decision  ~-
~ ·~~ 
favor. First, resp argues that "Park 'N Fly" is a merely 
descriptive mark and thus is inherently unenforceable. As your 
• 
- - 9. 
memo notes, this position seems inconsistent with CA9 's. CA9 
affirmed the DC's decision that petr's mark could not be 
invalidated because it had achieved incontestable status. It 
thus implicitly rejected the notion that the registration was 
void ab initio. 
Moreover, on the merits, I think resp' s view is wrong. It 
~ 
is true that merely descriptive marks are normally not entitled 
to protection absent proof of secondary meaning. ~, 
Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (1976). 
Accordingly, as a matter of policy, the resp' s position makes 
sense. Still, I do not think that this it is not the position 
adopted by the Lanham Act. By not including it among the 
defenses available under §1115 (b), or among the exceptions to 
incontestability under §1065, the Act adopted a policy of laches 
with respect to merely descriptive marks. A potential infringer 
has five years in which to challenge the registration as merely 
descriptive or thereafter live with the consequences. See 
Fletcher, "Incontestability and Constructive Notice: A Quarter 
Century of Adjudication," 63 Trade-Mark Reporter 71, 97 (1973). 
Congress could have prohibited merely descriptive marks from 
achieving incontestable status, as it did with generic terms, see 
§1065(4), but it did not. 
Resp also argues, without citing authority, that 
registration is a purely ministerial act which creates no 
substantive rights. It maintains that to refuse to allow mere 
descriptiveness as a defense enforcement of a mark is 
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be reluctant to allow merely descriptive marks to be taken out of 
the public domain on the basis of ex parte affidavits filed with 
the PTO. 
As a matter of policy, resp makes a persuasive point. Once ~ 
----
again, however, I think the answer is simply that Congress 
-'--,. - _ _____.. 
actopted a different policy. The Lanham Act allows the purely -ministerial act of registration to ripen into a substantive 
evidentiary privilege on the terms of §1115(b). Moreover, as the 
Amici point out, the statute provides quite a few ways to avoid 
the result of the incontestability provisions in particular 
cases. There are, of course, the seven defenses provided in 
§1115 (b) . In addition, §1065, which provides for the 
establishment of incontestable status, incorporates two of the 
exceptions to registration in general (§1064(c) & (e)) and 
precludes generic names from obtaining such status. Section 1116 
authorizes courts to issue injunctions to enforce trademark 
rights "according to the principles of equity and upon such terms 
as the court may deem reasonable," thus apparently ensuring that 
the courts have discretion to recognize equitable defenses to 
incontestability. Finally, as even the Ninth Circuit recognized 
recently, there can be no liability for infringement, even with 
respect to an incontestable mark, in the absence of proof of 
likelihood of confusion. Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen CQ.f.E .. ! . ..' 725 
F.2d 1240 (CA9 1984). 
I think resp's other arguments are without merit. Petr is 
not required to show a secondary meaning once it establishes that 
its mark is incontestable. Although resp correctly cites a 
- - 11. 
number of cases in which courts have found that an incontestable 
descriptive mark had a secondary meaning, there is nevertheless 
no justification for requiring such proof under the statute. 
Similarly, resp's claim that it has a privity defense under 
§1115 (b) ( 5) is not persuasive. The DC found "no evidence" that 
resp was in fact in privity with a prior user of the name "Park 
and Fly." Al though the CA did not reach this issue, the DC' s 
finding seems clearly correct. 
III. Conclusion 
Resp's basic argument is one of policy: it seems incongruous 
to allow a merely descriptive mark to achieve incontestable 
status and then serve as conclusive evidence in an infringement 
action absent any proof of secondary meaning. 
this result is the one mandated by the statute. 
Still, I think 
Moreover, I suspect that the result here is somewhat 
anomalous. The real problem in this case seems to be that resp 
presented a very poor defense in the DC. Resp should have been 
able to prove that petr was not entitled to incontestable status 
in the first place because the mark "Park 'N Fly" is generic, 
i.e., a term which is widely understood as referring to the genus 
of airport parking services. But as CA9 pointed out, resp 
presented absolutely no evidence with respect to consumers' --- - -- ------
perceptions of the term. Accordingly, it concluded: "Without 
'----- -- - - - -
evidence that to the consuming public the primary significance of 
the term is to denote the service Park 'N Fly offers and not its 
source, we are without a sufficient evidentiary basis to find 
/1;:!_ 
-
Park 'N Fly' s mark generic. 11 JA at 84. 
here is unfortunate, I doubt that 
- 12. 
Thus, while the result 
most cases involving 
incontestable marks, even merely descriptive ones, are likely to 
end up protecting marks as weak as this one is. 
I recommend that you vote to reverse. 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1132 
PARK 'N FLY, INC., PETITIONER v. 
DOLLAR PARK AND FLY, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[October-, 1984) 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we consider whether an action to enjoin the in-
fringement of an incontestable trade or service m k may be 
defended on the ounas that the mark is merely de~ ve. 
We 'conc1uoetnaf neither th_tla..n@~e of the relevan t stat-
utes~nor the legislative7ristory supports such a defense. 
I 
Petitioner operates long-term parking lots near airports. 
After starting business in St. Louis in 1967, petitioner subse-
quently opened facilities in Cleveland, Houston, Boston, 
Memphis, and San Francisco. Petitioner applied in 1969 to 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Of-
fice) to register a service mark consisting of the logo of an air-
plane and the words "Park 'N Fly." 1 The registration is-
sued in August 1971. Nearly six years later, petitioner filed 
'The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 
15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., generally applies the same principles concerning 
registration and protection to both trade and service marks. See § 3, 15 
U. S. C. § 1053. The Lanham Act defines a trademark to include "any 
word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and 
used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish 
them from those manufactured or sold by others."§ 45, 15 U. S. C. § 1127. 
A service mark is "a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to 
identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the services 
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an affidavit with the Patent Office to establish the incontest-
able status of the mark. 2 As required by § 15 of the Trade-
mark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 433, as amended, 15 
U. S. C. § 1065, the affidavit stated that the mark had been 
registered and in continuous use for five consecutive years, 
that there had been no final adverse decision to petitioner's 
claim of ownership or right to registration, and that no pro-
ceedings involving such rights were pending. Incontestable 
status provides, subject to the provisions of§ 15 and§ 33(b) of 
the Lanham Act, "conclusive evidence of the the registrant's 
exclusive right to use the registered mark .... " § 33(b), 15 
U. S. C. § 1115(b). 
Respondent also provides long-term airport parking serv-
ices, but only has operations in Portland, Oregon. Respond-
ent calls its business "Dollar Park and Fly." Petitioner filed 
this infringement action in 1978 in the United States District 
Court for the District of Oregon and requested the court per-
manently to enjoin respondent from using the words "Park 
and Fly" in connection with its business. Respondent 
counterclaimed and sought cancellation of petitioner's mark 
on the grounds that it is a generic term. See § 14(c), 15 
U. S. C. § 1064(c). Respondent also argued that petitioner's 
mark is unenforceable because it is merely descriptive. See 
§ 2(e), 15 U. S. C. § 1052(e). As two additional defenses, re-
spondent maintained that it is in privity with a Seattle cor-
poration that has used the expression "Park and Fly'' since a 
date prior to the registration of petitioner's mark, see J..., / S 
§ ~3(b)(5), 15 U. S. C. ~ 1115(~)(5)
1 
and that it h¥ not in- / / 
frmged because there 1s no hkehhood of confus10n. See 
§ 32(1), 15 U. S. C. § 1114(1). 
After a bench trial, the District Court found that petition-
er's mark is not generic and observed that an incontestable 
2 Petitioner also applied in 1977 to register a mark consisting only of the 
words "Park 'N Fly." That mark issued in 1979, but has not become in-
contestable. The existence of this mark does not affect our resolution of 
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mark cannot be challenged on the grounds that it is merely 
descriptive. App. 75. The District Court also concluded 
that #}at was no evidence of privity between respondent and 
the Seattle corporation. App. 76. Finally, the District 
Court found sufficient evidence of likelihood of confusion. 
App. 76. The District Court permanently enjoined respond-
ent from using the words "Park and Fly'' and any other mark 
confusingly similar to "Park 'N Fly." App. 77. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 718 
F. 2d 327 (1983). The District Court did not err, the Court 
of Appeals held, in refusing to invalidate petitioner's mark. 
Id., at 331. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that it 
previously had held that incontestability provides a defense 
against the cancellation of a mark, but it may not be used of-
fensively to enjoin another's use. Ibid. Petitioner, under 
this analysis, could obtain an injunction only if its mark would 
be entitled to continued registration without regard to its in-
contestable status. Thus, respondent could defend the in-
fringement action by showing that the mark was merely de-
scriptive. Based on its own examination of the record, the 
Court of Appeals then determined that petitioner's mark is in 
fact merely descriptive, and therefore respondent should not 
be enjoined from using the name "Park and Fly." Ibid. 
The decision below is in direct conflict with the decision of 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Union Car-
bide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F. 2d 366, cert,. denied, 
429 U. S. 830 (1976). We granted certiorari to resolve this 
conflict, and we now reverse. 
II 
Congress enacted the ~anham A~n 194§.in order to pro-
vide national protection fottraaeniarksusedin interstate and 
foreign commerce. Sen. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 5 (1946). Previous federal legislation, such as the 
Federal Trademark Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 724, reflected the 
view that protection of trademarks was a matter of state con-
cern and that the right to a mark depended solely on the com-
I I 
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mon law. Ibid. Consequently, rights to trademarks were 
uncertain and subject to variation in different parts of the 
country. Because trademarks desirably promote compe-
tition and the maintenance of product quality, Congress de-
termined that "a sound public policy requires that trade-
marks should receive nationally the greatest protection that 
can be given them." Id., at 6. Among the new protections 
created by the Lanham Act were the statutory provisions 
that allow a federally registered mark to become incontest-
able. §§ 15, 33(b), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1065, 1115(b). 
The provisions of the Lanham Act concerning registration ( 
and incontestability distinguish a mark that is "the common 
descriptive name of an article or substance," from a mark 
that is "merely descriptive." §§ 2(e), 14(c), 15 U. S. C'. 
§§ 1052(e), 1064(c). Marks that constitute a common de-
scriptive name are referred to as generic. A generic term is 
one that refers to the genus of which the particular product is 
a species. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 
Inc., 537 F. 2d 4, 9 (CA21976). Generic terms are not regis-
trable, and a registered mark may be cancelled at any time on 
the grounds that it has become generic. See §§ 2, 14(c), 15 
U. S. C. §§ 1052, 1064(c). A "merely descriptive" mark, in 
contrast, describes the qualities or characteristics of a good 
or service, and this type of mark may be registered only if 
the registrant shows that it has acquired secondary meaning, 
i. e., it "has become distinctive of thJ applicant's goods in 
commerce." §§ 2(e), (f), 15 U. S. C(l052(e), (f). 
This case requires us to consider the effect of the incon- \ 
testability provisions of the Lanham Act in the context of an 
infringement action def ended on the grounds that the mark is 
mere y escr1pt1ve. tatutory cons c 10n must begin with 
th~oyed by Congress and the assumption that 
the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses 
the legislative purpose. See American Tobacco Co. v. Pat-
terson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982). With respect to incontest-
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that "registration shall be conclusive evidence of the regis-
trant's exclusive right to use the registered mark" subject to 
the conditions of § 15 and certain enumerated defenses. 3 
Section 15 incorporates by reference subsections (c) and (e) of 
3 Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act, as set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 1115(b), 
provides: 
"If the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable under 
section 1065 of this title the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the 
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce or in 
connection with the goods or services specified in the affidavit filed under 
the provisions of said section 1065 subject to any conditions or limitations 
stated therein except when one of the following defenses or defects is 
established: 
(1) That the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was 
obtained fraudulently; or 
(2) That the mark has been abandoned by the registrant; or 
(3) That the registered mark is being used, by or with the permission of 
the registrant or a person in privity with the registrant, so as to misrepre-
sent the source of the goods or services in connection with which the mark 
is used; or 
(4)iat the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an 
infrin ent is a use, otherwise than as a trade or service mark, of the par-
ty's i dividual name in his own business, or of the individual name of any-
one in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of 
and used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or serv-
ices of such party, or their geographic origin; or 
(5) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement 
was adopted without knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been 
continuously used by such party or those in privity with him from a date 
prior to registration of the mark under this chapter or publication of the 
registered mark under subsection (c) of section 1062 of this title: Provided, 
however, That this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in which 
such continuous prior use is proved; or 
(6) That the mark whose use is charged as an infringement was regis-
tered and used prior to the registration under this chapter or publication 
under subsection (c) of section 1062 of this title of the registered mark of 
the registrant, and not abandoned: Provided, however, That this defense or 
defect shall apply only for the area in which the mark was used prior to 
such registration or such publication of the registrant's mark; or 
(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws 
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§ 14, 15 U. S. cjio64. An incontestable mark that becomes 
generic may be cancelled at any time pursuant to § 14(c). 
That section also allows cancellation of an incontestable mark 
at any time if it has been abandoned, if it is being used to mis-
represent the source of the goods or services in connection 
with which it is used, or if it was obtained fraudulently or 
contrary to the provisions of § 4, 15 U. S. C. § 1054, or 
§§2(a}-(c), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1052(a}-(c).4 
One searches the language of the Lanham Act in vain to j 
find any support for the offensive/defensive distinction ap-
plied by the Court of Appeals. The statute nowhere 
distinguishes between a registrant's offensive and defensive 
use of an incontestable mark. On the contrary, § 33(b)'s dec-
laration that the registrant has an "exclusive right" to use the 
mark indicates that incontestable status may be used to en-
join infringement by others. A conclusion that such in-
fringement cannot be enjoined renders meaningless the "ex-
clusive right" recognized by the statute. Moreover, the 
language in three of the def ens es enumerated in § 33(b) 
clearly contemplates the use of incontestability in infringe-
ment actions by plaintiffs. See §§ 33(b)(4}-(6), 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 1115(b)(4}-(6). 
The language of the the Lanham Act also refutes any con-
clusion that an incontestable mark may be challenged as 
merely descriptive. A mark that is merely descriptive of an 
applicant's goods or services is not registrable unless the 
mark has secondary meaning. Before a mark achieves in-
contestable status, registration provides prima facie evi-
dence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in 
commerce. § 33(a), 15 U. S. C. § 1115(a). The Lanham Act 
expressly provides that before a mark becomes incontestable 
an opposing party may prove any legal or equitable defense 
which might have been asserted if the mark had not been reg-
• Sections 2(a)-(c) prohibit registration of marks containing specified 
subject matter, e. g. , the flag of the United States. Sections 4 and 14(e) 
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istered. Ibid. Thus, § 33(a) would have allowed respondent 
to challenge petitioner's mark as merely descriptive if the 
mark had not become incontestable. With respect to incon-
testable marks, however, § 33(b) provides that registration is 
conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use 
the mark, subject to the conditions of § 15 and the seven de-
fenses enumerated in § 33(b) itself. Mere descriptiveness is 
not recognized by either § 15 or§ 33(b) as a basis for challeng-
ing an incontestable mark. 
The statutory provisions that prohibit registration of a 
merely descriptive mark but do not allow an incontestable 
mark to be challenged on this ground cannot be attributed to 
inadvertence by Congress. The Conference Committee re-
jected an amendment that would have denied registration to 
any descriptive mark, and instead retained the provisions al-
lowing registration of a merely descriptive mark that has ac-
quired secondary meaning. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2322, 
79th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1946) (explanatory statement of 
House managers). The Conference Committee agreed to an 
amendment providing that no incontestable right can be ac-
quired in a mark that is a common descriptive, i. e., generic, 
term. Id., at 5. Congress could easily have denied incon-
testability to merely descriptive marks as well as to generic 
marks had that been its intention. 
The Court of Appeals in discussin the offensive/defensive 
distinction o serve that incontestability protects a regis-
tra:rltagainst cancetlation of his mark. 710"-F. 2a, at 331. 
This o serva 10n 1s mcru:rect with respect to marks that be-
comegeneric or which otherwise may be cancelled at any 
time pursuant to §§ 14(c) and (e). Moreover, as applied to 
marks that are merely descriptive, the approach of the Court 
of Appeals makes incontestable status superfluous. Without 
regard to its incontestable status, a mark that has been regis-
tered five years is protected from cancellation except on the 
grounds stated in §§ 14(c) and (e). Pursuant to § 14, a mark 
may be cancelled on the grounds that it is merely descriptive 
I • 
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only if the petition to cancel is filed within five years of the 
date of registration. § 14(a), 15 U. S. C. § 1064(a). The ap-
proach adopted by the Court of Appeals implies that incon-
testability adds nothing to the protections against cancella-
tion already provided in § 14. The decision below not only 
lacks support in the words of the statute, but it effectively 
emasculates § 33(b) under the circumstances of this case. 
III 
f the Lanham Act sup-
e plain language of the statutory 
prov1srnns concernmg~ ndeed, a conclusion 
that incontestable status can provide the basis for enforce-
ment of the registrant's exclusive right to use a trade or serv-
ice mark promotes the goals of the statute. The Lanham 
Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to se-
cure to the owner of the mark the good will of his business 
and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among 
competing producers. See S. Rep. No. 1333, supra, at 3, 5. 
National protection of trademarks is desirable, Congress con-
cluded, because trademarks foster competition and the main-
tenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of 
good reputation. Id., at 4. The incontestability provisions, 
as the proponents of the Lanham Act emphasized, provide a 
means for the registrant to quiet title in the ownership of his 
mark. See Hearings on H. R. 82 before the Subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 21 
(1944) (remarks of Rep. Lanham); id., at 21, 112 (testimony 
of Daphne Robert, ABA Committee on Trade Mark Legisla-
tion); Hearings on H. R. 102 et al. before the Subcommittee 
on Trade-Marks of the House Committee on Patents, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 72 (1941) (remarks of Rep. Lanham). The 
opportunity to obtain incontestable status by satisfying the 
requirements of § 15 thus encourages producers to cultivate 
the good will associated with a particular mark. This func-
tion of the incontestability provisions would be utterly frus-
I I 
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trated if the holder of an incontestable mark could not enjoin 
infringement by others so long as they established that the 
mark would not be registrable but for its incontestable 
status. 
Respondent argues, however, that enforcing petitioner's 
mark would conflict with the goals of the Lanham Act be-
cause the mark is merely descriptive and should never have 
been registered in the first place. Representative Lanham, 
respondent notes, explained that the defenses enumerated in 
§ 33(b) were "not intended to enlarge, restrict, amend, or 
modify the substantive law of trademarks either as set out in 
other sections of the act or as heretofore applied by the 
courts under prior laws." 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946). Re-
spondent reasons that because the Lanham Act did not alter 
the substantive law of trademarks, the incontestability provi-
sions cannot protect petitioner's use of the mark if it were not 
originally registrable. Moreover, inasmuch as petitioner's 
mark is merely descriptive, respondent contends that enjoin-
ing others from using the mark will not encourage compe-
tition by assisting consumers in their ability to distinguish 
among competing producers. 
These arguments are unpersuasive. Representative 
Lanham's remarks, if read in context, clearly refer to the ef-
fect of the defenses enumerated in § 33(b). 5 There is no 
question that the Lanham Act altered existing law concern-
ing trademark rights in several respects. For example, § 22, 
15 U. S. C. § 1072, provides for constructive notice of reg-
istration and modifies the common law rule that allowed ac-
5 Representative Lanham made his remarks to clarify that the seven de-
fenses enumerated in § 33(b) are not substantive rules of law which go to 
the validity or enforceablity of an incontestable mark. 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 
(1946). Instead, the defenses affect the evidentiary status of registration 
where the owner claims the benefit of a mark's incontestable status. If 
one of the defenses is established, registration constitutes only prima facie 
and not conclusive evidence of the owner's right to exclusive use of the 
mark. Ibid. See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. , 6 
(1946) (explanatory statement of House managers). 
•• I 
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quisition of concurrent rights by users in distinct geographic 
areas if the subsequent user adopted the mark without 
knowledge of prior use. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. 
Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 415-416 (1916) (describing pre-
Lanham Act law). Similarly, § 14 cuts off certain grounds 
for cancellation five years after registration and thereby 
modifies the previous rule that the validity of a trademark 
could be attacked at any time. See White House Milk Prod-
ucts Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co. , 111 F. 2d 490 (CCPA 1940). 
Most significantly, Representative Lanham himself observed 
that incontestability was one of "the valuable new rights cre-
ated by the act." 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946). 
Respondent's argument that enforcing petitioner's mark I 
will not promote the goals of the Lanham Act is misdirected. 
Arguments similar to those now urged by respondent were in 
fact considered by Congress in hearings on the Lanham Act. 
For example, the United States Department of Justice op-
posed the incontestability provisions and expressly noted 
that a merely descriptive mark might become incontestable. 
Hearings on H. R. 82, supra, at 59-60 (statement of the 
U. S. Dept. of Justice). This result, the Department of Jus-
tice observed, would "go beyond existing law in conferring 
unprecedented rights on trade-mark owners," and would un-
desirably create an exclusive right to use language that is de-
scriptive of a product. Id., at 60; see also Hearings on H. R. 
102, supra, at 106-107, 109-110 (testimony of Prof. Milton 
Handler); id. , at 107, 175 (testimony of attorney Louis Robin-
son). These concerns were answered by proponents of the 
Lanham Act, who noted that a merely descriptive mark can-
not be registered unless the Commissioner finds that it has 
secondary meaning. Id., at 108, 113 (testimony of Karl 
Pohl, U. S. Trade Mark Assn.). Moreover, a mark can be 
challenged for five years prior to its attaining incontestable 
status. Id., at 114 (remarks of Rep. Lanham). The sup-
porters of the incontestability provisions further observed 
that a generic mark cannot become incontestable and that 
I I 
83-1132-0PINION 
PARK 'N FLY, INC. v. DOLLAR PARK & FLY, INC. 11 
§ 33(b)(4) allows the non-trademark use of descriptive terms 
used in an incontestable mark. Id., at 110-111 (testimony of 
Wallace Martin, chairman, ABA Committee on Trade Mark 
Legislation). 
The alternative of refusing to provide incontestable status 
for descriptive marks with secondary meaning was expressly 
noted in the hearings on the Lanham Act. Id., at 64, 69 (tes-
timony of Robert Byerley, New York Patent Law Assn.); 
Hearings on S. 895 before the Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Patents, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 42 (1942) (testi-
mony of Elliot Moyer, Special Asst. to the Attorney Gen-
eral). Also mentioned was the possibility of including as a 
defense to infringement of an incontestable mark the "fact 
that a mark is a descriptive, generic, or geographical term or 
device." Id., at 45, 47. Congress, however, did not adopt 
either of these alternatives. Instead, Congress expressly 
provided in§§ 33(b) and 15 that an incontestable mark could 
be challenged on specified grounds, and the grounds identi-
fied by Congress do not include mere descriptiveness. 
IV 
Respondent argues that the decision by the Court of Ap-
peals should be upheld because trademark registrations are 
issued by the Patent Office after an ex parte proceeding and 
generally without inquiry into the merits of an application. -
Enforcing incontestable marks that are merely descriptive, 
respondent contends, will improperly "take[] out of the lan-
guage" ideas that should remain part of the public domain. 
Brief for Respondent 27. This argument also unravels UQ_Qn 
close examination. The factso f thiscase belie the sugges-
tio~ ation is virtually automatic. The Patent Of-
fice initially denied petitioner's application because the exam-
iner considered the mark to be merely descriptive. 
, Petitioner sought reconsideration and successfully persuaded 
the Patent Office that its mark was registrable. 
I I 
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More generally, res ondent is simply wron to suggest 
that third parties do not have an opportunity to challenge 
applications for trademark registration. If the Patent Office 
examiner determines that an applicant appears to be entitled 
to registration, the mark is published in the Official Gazette. 
§ 12(a), 15 U. S. C. § 1062(a). Within thirty days of publica-
tion, any person who believes that he would be damaged by 
registration of the mark may file an opposition. § 13, 15 
U. S. C. § 1063. Registration of a mark provides construc-
tive notice throughout the United States of the registrant's 
claim to ownership. § 22, 15 U. S. C. § 1072. Within five 
years of registration, any person who believes that he is or 
will be damaged by registration may seek to cancel a mark. 
§ 14(a), 15 U. S. C. § 1064(a). A mark may be cancelled at 
any time for certain specified grounds, including that it was 
obtained fraudulently or has become generic. § 14(c), 15 
U. S. C. § 1064(c). In effect, respondent argues that these 
detailed statutory provisions offer insufficient protection 
against improper registration of a merely descriptive mark, 
and therefore the validity of petitioner's mark may be chal-
lenged notwithstanding its incontestable status. Our 
responsibility, however, is not to evaluate the wisdom of the 
legislative determinations reflected in the statutes, but is in-
stead to construe and apply the provisions that Congress 
enacted. 
V 
The Court of Appeals did not attempt to justify its decision 111 
by reference to the language or legislative history of the V \ 
Lanham Ac . ns ea , t cou re e on 1 s previous deci-
sionrirTittamook County Creamery v. Tillamook Cheese & 
Dairy Assn., 345 F. 2d 158, 163 (CA9), cert. denied, 382 
U. S. 903 (1965), for the proposition that a registrant may not 
rely on incontestability to enjoin the use of the mark by oth-
ers. Examination of Tillamook, however, reveals that there 
is no persuasive justification for the judicially-created distinc-
• I 
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tion between offensive and defensive use of an incontestable 
mark. 
Tillamook discussed in dicta the offensive/defensive dis-
tinction and observed that incontestability protects a regis-
trant against cancellation but cannot be used to obtain relief 
from an infringing use. Tillamook's authority for this prop-
osition was John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 
F. 2d 314, 316 (CA 7 1961), which did reverse a finding of in-
fringement on the grounds that incontestable status confers 
only defensive rights. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit based its holding in John Morrell on Rand M cN ally 
& Co. v. Christmas Club, 105 U. S. P. Q. 499 (1955), aff'd 
242 F. 2d 776 (CCP A 1957), but the latter case did not in fact 
involve the use of an incontestable mark in an enforcement 
action. 
The Patent Office in Rand M cN ally denied a petition to 
cancel a mark challenged as merely descriptive. The peti-
tioner feared that if the mark became incontestable, use of 
the same mark in connection with a service different from the 
one specified in the registration could be enjoined. 105 
U. S. P. Q., at 500. The Assistant Commissioner of Patents 
answered this concern by observing that an incontestable 
mark does not provide the registrant "with an 'offensive 
weapon' of any greater magnitude than that which it has had 
since the registration issued .... " 105 U. S. P. Q., at 501. 
These comments do not suggest- that incontestability may 
never provide the basis for injunctive relief, but instead indi-
cate that a mark may not be expanded beyond the good or 
service for which it was originally designated: 
John Morrell, the judicial authority providing the most di-
rect support for the decision below, was subsequently over-
ruled in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F. 2d 
366 (CA7), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 830 (1976). In Union Car-
bide the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that its earlier decision in John Morrell was unsup-
ported by the language or legislative history of the Lanham 
• • I 
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Act and had been based on a misreading of Rand McNally. 
531 F. 2d, at 373, 377. A registrant may rely on the incon-
testable status of the mark in an infringement action, Union 
Carbide concluded, and a '"[d]efendant faced with an incon-
testable registered mark cannot def end by claiming that the 
mark is invalid because it is descriptive. ' " Id., at 377 ( quoting 
1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11.16, 
p. 377 (1st ed. 1973)). 
Other courts have subsequently followed Union Carbide 
and concluded that a plaintiff may rely on the incontestable 
status of a trade or service mark in an infringement action. 
See, e. g., United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 
639 F. 2d 134, 137 (CA3 1981); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 
617 F. 2d 1178, 1184-1185 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 
981 (1981). The Patent Office has also rejected any 
offensive/defensive distinction with respect to the use of an 
incontestable mark. See Ansul Co. v. Malter Int'l Corp., 
199 U. S. P. Q. 596, 599-600 (TTAB 1978). Thus, the doc-
trine relied on by the Court of Appeals in this case is best 
described as flawed in its origin and subsequently discredited 
by its progenitors. 
VI 
W ~ that the holder of a registered mark may rely 
on, in~bility to e_!}join infri!!S'ement and that such an 
action may not be defended on tlie ounds that the is 
mere y escr1p 1ve. espondent urges that we neverthe-
less affirm the ctecision below based on the "prior use" de-
fense recognized by § 33(b)(5) of the Lanham Act. Alterna-
tively, respondent argues that there is no likelihood of 
confusion and therefore no infringement justifying injunctive 
relief. The District Court rejected each of these arguments, 
but they were not addressed by the Court of Appeals. 718 
6 This case does not present, and we do not address, the issue of the 
availability of equitable defenses in an action to enforce an incontestable 
mark. See generally Comment, Incontestable Trademark Rights and Eq-
uitable Defenses in Infringement Litigation, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 1067 (1982). 
J • I 
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F. 2d, at 331-332 n. 4. That court may consider them on re-
mand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed 
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
- -
October 29, 1984 
83-1132 Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc. 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
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October 29, 1984 
-
No. 83-1132 Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. 
Dear John, 
L-
With respect to your concerns, I first observe that 
it is unnecessary to assume that Park 'N Fly was not 
originally entitled to registration under the Act. The 
issue as presented by the holding below is whether the 
infringement action can be defended on the grounds that the 
mark is now merely descriptive. The draft opinion does not 
address the question whether the mark properly issued 
initially. This point might be clarified by the addition of 
a footnote which I will add to the first sentence of the 
first full paragraph on page 9 of the draft as follows: 
Respondent contends that petitioner never 
claimed secondary meaning for the mark. 
Assuming that this proposition is true, it 
does not imply that registration improperly 
issued. Petitioner could, and apparently 
did, achieve registration by persuading the 
Patent Office that the mark was not merely 
descriptive. App. 54-57. 
The Court of Appeals did not conclude that the mark 
improperly issued originally, but instead held that the mark 
at present is merely descriptive and observed that 
petitioner has not claimed that it has acquired secondary 
meaning. 718 F.2d, at 331. Thus, the holding of the Court 
of Appeals is not that an infringer can defend on the 
grounds that the mark was improperly issued because of plain 
error by Examiner, and we need not determine in this case 
whether such a defense may be asserted against an 
incontestable mark. Footnote 6 of the draft opinion 
expressly notes that we do not address the availability of 
equitable defenses. I add, however, that it is difficult to 
believe that Congress intended that the incontestability 
provisions would provide a means to quiet title in 
trademarks, but that incontestable marks could be challenged 
in an infringement action on the grounds that the Examiner 
erred in issuing the mark. 
- - 2. 
With respect to the legislative history, the point 
made in the draft opinion is that opponents of the 
incontestability provisions expressed concerns that merely 
descriptive marks might become incontestable, and that 
Congress addressed these concerns by providing particular 
statutory safeguards. These safeguards do not include the 
right to defend an infringement action on the grounds that 
an incontestable mark either was orginally or has become 
merely descriptive. I note that Congress expressly allowed 
a defense on the grounds that the registration was obtained 
fraudulently and pe r mitted a mark to be challenged at any 
time on the grounds that it has become generic. 
Rand McNally's statement concerning the use of 
incontestability as an "offensive weapon" cannot be 
characterized as precedent having persuasive force in the 
instant case. As the draft notes, the statement was dicta 
made in the context of a petition to cancel· a descriptive 
mark that did poss ess secondary meaning. Moreover, even if 
the statement were interpreted to declare that an 
infringement action can be defended on the grounds that an 
incontestable mark is merely descriptive, that conclusion, 
as the draft explains, would conflict with the language and 
legislative history of the statute. Thus, I think that the 
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October 29, 1984 
Re: 83-1132 - Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar 
Park And Fly, Inc. 
Dear Sandra: 
V 
This case continues to trouble me. I think we 
must make an assumption that I do not believe your 
opinion ever expressJy confronts, namely that the "Park 
•~ Fly" trademark was not entitled to registration 
under the Act. 
As you note on page 4, page 6, and again on page 
10, a descriptive mark may be registered only if the 
registrant shows that it has acquired secondary 
meaning. Petitioner made no such showing. Instead, it 
convinced the Examiner that the mark was not 
descriptive. The Court of Appeals disagreed with that 
conclusion and I think your opinion assumes that this 
is indeed a merely descriptive mark. Without any 
finding on the secondary meaning issue, it necessarily 
follows that the mark was not entitled to registration. 
If you accept this analysis, your treatment of the 
legislative history on page 10 is flawed because the 
answer of the proponents of the Act "who noted that a 
merely descriptive mark cannot be registered unless the 
commissioner finds that it has secondary meaning" does 
not deal with the problem that this case presents. 
I am also afraid that you have overstated the 
holding of the Court of Appeals. The court did not 
hold that an infringer can defend simply because a mark 
is descriptive. Rather, he can defend on the ground 
that (1) the mark is descriptive and (2) should not 
have been registered because it did not acquire a 
secondary meaning. It surely is at least arguable that 
there may be some nonstatutory equitable defenses--such 
as laches or unclean hands--to infringement actions 
even after a mark has become incontestable. The 
~ I> - -
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respondent argues that there should be room for such an 
equitable defense if the record discloses that the mark 
was registered as a result of plain error committed by 
the Examiner. I am not sure your opinion fully 
responds to that argument. 
Finally, I think there is more force in the Rand 
McNally precedent than the opinion acknowledges. --yr-we 
take the comment of the Assistant Commissioner of 
Patents at face value, it does support respondent. For 
it is clear that the Park 'N Fly mark could not have 
been used as an "offensive weapon" immediately after 
registration without proof of secondary meaning, but 
now it may be enforced even if the infrigner proves 
that the mark never acquired secondary meaning. Thus, 
in direct contrast to the Assistant Commissioner's 
comment, incontestability has provided this 
registrant "with an 'offensive weapon' of any 
greater magnitude than that which it has had since 
the registration issued ..•. " (Draft op., at 10, 
quoting from 105 U.S.P.Q., at 501. 
In sum, I cannot join your opinion as presently 
drafted. I will try my hand at a different approach 
and, frankly, am still in some doubt as to how I will 
eventually come out. 
Justice O'Connor 
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Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
October 30, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1132-Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
and FlY.L Inc. 
Dear Sandra: 
I am not yet at rest on this one. 
Justice O'Connor 
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October 30, 1984 
Re: 83-1132 - Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar 
Park And Fly, Inc. 
Dear Sandra: 
Thank you for your prompt reply to my letter. 
With all due respect, however, I am afraid that your 
new footnote will just compound the confusion. If you 
assume that the mark never acquired secondary meaning, 
that assumption certainly does imply that the 
registration issued improperly. For I do not 
understand your opinion to disagree with the Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that the mark is merely 
descriptive, and, of course, the statute plainly 
provides that a merely descriptive mark may not be 
registered unless it has acquired secondary meaning. 
You are, of course, entirely correct in noting 
that in view of the fact that Congress inten~ed the 
inconstestability provisions to provide a means to 
quiet title in trademarks, it necessarily follo~ that 
incontestable marks cannot be challenged in an 
infringement action on the ground that the mark was 
erroneously issued. But, as the Rand McNally case 
demonstrates, the fact that an alleged i nfringer is not 
entitled to have a mark canceled--i.e., to challenge 
the mark--does not answer the question whether the 
owner of the mark is entitled to obtain injunctive 
relief against the infringer. 
I recognize that your footnote 6 states that we do 
not address the availability of equitable defenses in 
an action enforcing an incontestable mark. But if you 
are willing to assume that the use of the word 
"exclusive" in§ 33{b) does not necessarily require 
rejection of equitable defenses, I do not understand 
why that word should carry enough force to require 
rejection of a defense that the mark should never have 
issued in the first instance. 
-·~ --
✓ 
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Perhaps the heart of the problem is our 
disagreement about the correct phrasing of the issue 
before the Court. In the first sentence of your 
opinion--and the second sentence of your letter--you 
state the issue as whether the infringement can be 
defended on the ground that the mark is merely 
descriptive. I agree completely that such a defense is 
insufficient. But the question, as I see it, is 
whether the action may be defended on the ground that 
the mark is (1) merely descriptive and (2) never 
acquired secondary meaning, and therefore was never 
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No. 83-1132 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. 
Dear John, 
I suppose little more can be gained from a further 
exchange of letters in this case, but I will make one last 
effort. Even if we assume that the mark is now merely 
descriptive, it does not follow that it improperly issued in 
1967. Petitioner apparently persuaded the Patent Office 
that the mark was registrable because it was suggestive and 
not merely descriptive. See app. 54-57. The nature of a 
particular trademark is not static, as evidenced by the fact 
that Congress expressly provided that a mark may be 
cancelled at any time if it becomes generic. 
Moreover, I am convinced that the incontestability 
provisions do not allow an infringer to defend merely on the 
grounds that the Patent Office erred in originally issuing 
the mark. Congress expressly provided that an incontestable 
mark can be challenged on the grounds that registration or 
the right to incontestabilty was fraudulently obtained. 15 
u.s.c. Slll5(b) (1). To conclude that an infringer may 
allege that a mark should never have issued in the first 
instance, for whatever reaso n, both would ignore the 
specific defenses selected by Congress and would effectively 
restore the pre-Lanham Act rule that the validity of a mark 
can raised at any time as a defense to an infringement 
action. I note parenthetically that respondent did claim in 
its initial answer that the mark at issue here had been 
fraudulently obtained. App. 17-19. This contention is not 
mentioned in the pretrial order, see app. 32-33, and was not 
pursued at trial. 
With respect to Rand McNally, it did not, of course, 
involve an incontestable mark and it establishes nothing 
even with respect to when such marks may be cancelled. 
Moreover, as the draft opinion notes at pp. 7-8, to conclude 
that incontestability only protects an incontestable mark 
against cancellation makes incontestability superfluous 
under the circumstances of this case. 
$ 
• - - 2. 
Finally, I do not think the draft is inconsistent in 
suggesting that equitable defenses might be available. I 
did not intend to imply that such defenses are in fact 
available, and there is disagreement on this issue among the 
lower courts. Compare Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar 
Financial Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1153 (CA9 1982) 
(incontestability no bar to defense of laches}, with United 
States Jaycees v. Chicago Jr. Assn. of Commerce & Industry, 
505 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Slll5(b} precludes 
equitable defenses}. The best argument that equitable 
defenses are available rests on the language of S34, 15 
u.s.c. §1116, which authorizes district courts to grant 
injunctions "according to the principles of equity." That 
this provision might permit a court to refuse to enjoin 
infringement of an incontestable mark based on equitable 
defenses does not suggest, however, that a court may 
consider as a defense challenges to the validity of the mark 
that are nowhere recognized in the statute. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
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